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ABSTRACT 
 As its closest challenger and greatest strategic rival, China poses a significant 
threat to the national security and global supremacy of the United States. The United 
States must exploit vulnerabilities across all elements of China’s national power, 
including cyberspace, to preserve U.S. strategic advantage as the global hegemon. To 
avoid escalating responses and brinkmanship between the two countries, it is essential to 
consider the economic, military, political, and technological interdependencies between 
the two states. China’s reliance on and control of cyberspace to promote domestic 
stability through the social credit system and the Great Firewall, as well as less advanced 
cyber security protocols and policies, present potential vulnerabilities. This thesis 
explores the feasibility of U.S. cyber operations, which are a non-kinetic and 
non-escalatory measure, to exploit these vulnerabilities, promote popular dissent in 
China, and undermine regime stability essential to China’s rise. Using cyber-kill chain 
theory and academic research on China’s cybersecurity system, this thesis explains 
conceptually the vulnerabilities identified by respective case studies of the social credit 
system and the Great Firewall; identifies targets of opportunity to exploit in tandem with 
traditional statecraft; and analyzes the respective vulnerability assessments via a heuristic 
thought experiment. 
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1 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
The rise of China has fostered a great power rivalry between that state and the 
world’s global hegemon, the United States. As the United States’ greatest strategic rival, 
China poses a significant threat to U.S. national security and global supremacy. To preserve 
its strategic advantage as the global hegemon, the United States must exploit Chinese 
vulnerabilities across all elements of national power, including cyberspace. Furthermore, 
it is essential to consider the economic, military, political, and technological 
interdependencies between the two states when developing the U.S. approach to China and 
avoiding escalatory responses and brinkmanship between the two countries. The 
exploration of the cyber domain as a non-kinetic effect presents a possible non-escalatory 
approach that can be used by the United States in concert with traditional elements of 
statecraft to achieve its strategic objectives.1 
The use of cyberspace and regime stability represents key tenets of China’s rise. 
China’s reliance on and control of cyberspace to promote domestic stability and economic 
growth, as well as less advanced cybersecurity protocols and policies present potential 
vulnerabilities.2 Exploration of these cyberspace vulnerabilities could be of benefit to the 
United States to preserve and enhance its strategic advantage. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The balance of global power has seen several significant shifts since the two World 
Wars and the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Since the 1990s, a 
period of great power rivalry has begun anew. This time the rivalry centers on the world’s 
global hegemon, the United States, and a rapidly rising China. As the United States’ 
greatest strategic rival, China poses a significant threat to U.S. national security and global 
supremacy. The 2018 U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission 
 
1 Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin M. Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness, Cyber Strategy : The Evolving 
Character of Power and Coercion (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), chap. 3. 
2 Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung, and Derek S. Reveron, China and Cybersecurity : Espionage, 
Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 6–14. 
2 
emphasized the effects of China’s strong economic growth, expanding military reach, and 
geopolitical influence on global stability through projects such as the Belt and Road 
Initiative.3  
Literature on U.S. grand strategy to address the rise of China represents the 
theoretical foundation of this study. Relevant literature emphasizes the dependencies 
between the political, economic, and technological elements of these two states, their 
global implications, and China’s use of cyberspace to achieve its strategic ambitions.  
The U.S. response to China, as well as broader global cyber activity, is well documented 
following the recent release of the U.S. National Cyber Strategy and the Department  
of Defense (DoD) Cyber Strategy. It is these linkages between China’s rise, the use  
of cyberspace, and the U.S. whole-of-government effort to maintain strategic 
advantageincluding DoD  use of persistent engagement within the cyber domainthat 
motivate this study. The academic literature presented in this review, illustrating the 
relationship between the rise of China and its reliance on cyberspace to achieve strategic 
ambitions, is a starting point for future research into China’s cyber vulnerabilities and their 
potential exploitation by the United States to preserve and enhance strategic advantage. 
The United States understands the depth of the interdependencies that exist between 
its own and China’s economy when developing national security and foreign policy. This 
is particularly reflected in the development of the U.S. National Cyber Strategy and DoD 
Cyber Strategy. Many observers believe that as China’s ascendance continues, so too will 
their global influence, economically, politically and militarily.4 While predictions indicate 
a slowing of China’s economy due to United States trade tariffs and China’s proposed 
 
3 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Report to Congress of the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission (Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O., 2018), 8. 
4 John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West; Can the Liberal System Survive?,” 
Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008): 23–37; John Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power 
of the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 3 (2014): 80–90; Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive How 
China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), chap. 2; Joseph 
S. Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power,” Wall Street Journal Asia, December 29, 2005, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113580867242333272; Minxin Pei, “Who’s Afraid of China’s 
Influence?,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 13, 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/
whos-afraid-of-chinas-influence/. 
3 
tightening of monetary policy, China’s economic rise will still continue.5 In consolidating 
strategic advantage for the United States, scholars present two main lines of enquiry. Some 
scholars argue that the rise of China and its emerging economy is important to the well-
being of the global economy.6 Others argue that the potential shift in economic power 
between the United States and China will influence global relationships between states.7 
Specifically, in the context of international relations theory, liberals suggest that countries 
will not go to war due to economic interdependencies as the cost of conflict outweighs the 
gain.8 On the other hand, realists discuss that the growing economic interdependence 
between China and the United States is an important consideration for the latter when 
consolidating strategic advantage. Failure of the global hegemon to consider these 
interdependencies during planning could result in potential conflict and domestic 
backlash.9 To reduce the risk of escalation, Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness propose non-
escalatory approaches such as cyber could be used to complement traditional forms of 
statecraft to achieve U.S. national or strategic objectives.10   
Internet technology is an important factor of China’s economic growth. Cyberspace 
has driven China’s technological advancement, bridging the technological gap between 
China and the United States to cement the former’s position of power on the world stage.11 
Scholars agree that the rapidity of this technological advancement is attributable to China’s 
theft of intellectual property and has created distrust within the U.S.–China relationship; 
 
5 “World Economic Outlook Update January 2019: A Weakening Global Expansion,” International 
Monetary Fund, January 2019, https:// www.imf.org/en/publications/weo. 
6 Robert E. Looney, Handbook of Emerging Economies (London and New York: Routledge, 2014). 
7 Uri Dadush, “Key Trends in the World Economy,” in Handbook of Emerging Economies. (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2014), 13–28. 
8 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their 
Economic and Social Advantage (New York and London: Putnam, 1910), 3–14. 
9 Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy 
after the Cold War,” International Security 21, no. 4 (1997): 49–88, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539283; John 
Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History 105, no. 690 (2006): 160–62. 
10 Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion, 
chap. 3. 
11 Adam Segal, Sharon Hom, Michael Sulmeyer, and Lobsang G. Sither, “Exploring Cybersecurity 
from China’s Perspective,” CS Monitor, last modified February 11, 2016, https://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Passcode/2016/0211/Exploring-cybersecurity-from-China-s-perspective. 
4 
moreover, it could steer those states toward potential future conflict and employment of 
hard power.12 Notable Chinese efforts to steal intellectual property from the U.S. 
Government include the 2003 cyber-attack “Titan Rain”13 and the 2015 attack on the U.S. 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM).14 In addition to cyber-attacks, Chinese cyber 
espionage efforts increased, with 44 percent of foreign cyber espionage cases prosecuted 
by the United States between 2008 and 2012 having a Chinese connection.15 Initially, 
scholars suggested that the 2015 U.S.–China Cyber Cooperation Agreement successfully 
addressed China’s cyber espionage within the economic sector and diffused tensions 
between the two states, temporarily decreasing Chinese espionage attempts against the 
United States.16 Nevertheless, the 2018 U.S. National Cyber Strategy confirmed China’s 
cyber espionage remains a threat to the United States, and the U.S. Federal Court 
proceedings against the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei illustrate that the 
United States is prepared to take action against such activity.17 The U.S. National Cyber 
Strategy also emphasizes the importance and role of cyberspace operations supported by 
all elements of national power as one option to achieve national security objectives.18  
Authoritarian regimes utilize the internet to advance political objectives. A key 
tenet of the 2018 U.S. Cyber Strategy is to ensure that authoritarian states promote an 
“open, interoperable, reliable and secure internet” and cease online censorship and 
 
12 Adam Segal et al., “Exploring Cybersecurity from China’s Perspective.”  
13 Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, Cyber Strategy : The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion, 
232. 
14 Kristin Finklea, Michelle D. Christensen, Eric A. Fischer, Susan V. Lawrence, and Catherine A. 
Theohary, Cyber Intrusion into U.S. Office of Personnel Management: In Brief ,CRS Report No. 7–5700 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2015): 10. https://crs.gov 
15 Lindsay, Cheung, and Reveron, China and Cybersecurity : Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the 
Digital Domain, 57. 
16 Sumeet Kumar, Matthew Benigni, and Kathleen M. Carley, “The Impact of U.S. Cyber Policies on 
Cyber-Attacks Trend,” in 2016 IEEE Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (2016): 181–86, 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISI.2016.7745464. 
17 Julia Horowitz, “Trade Tensions Are Easing. But the U.S. Crackdown on Huawei Is Just 
Beginning,” CNN Business, March 6, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/05/business/huawei-united-
states-cases/index.html. 
18 White House, National Cyber Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2018), 1–3, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf 
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repression.19 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and regime survival is a vital element 
of China’s rise, requiring the Chinese government to preserve domestic stability, at least in 
part, through controlling the population by digital means.20 China dedicates significant 
resources and Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies to controlling the population, and 
many scholars agree that internet control is a mechanism to maintain population support, 
prevent dissent, and promote domestic stability efforts both internal and external to 
China.21 Some scholars have explored these themes further and have identified two key 
cyber capabilitiesspecifically, China’s online social credit system22 and the Great 
Firewallas cyber tools employed to achieve regime stability, which is discussed in the 
following paragraphs.23  
China promotes domestic regime stability through internet content regulation and 
the social credit system. Jinghan Zeng et al. propose that China’s increased control over 
domestic cyberspace is driven by their concern over regime insecurity, and that the 
implementation of China’s social credit system is an indicator of this concern.24 Martin 
Chorzempa explains both commercial and government sponsored social credit schemes 
 
19 White House, National Cyber Strategy, 24. 
20 Suisheng Zhao, “The Ideological Campaign in Xi’s China: Rebuilding Regime Legitimacy,” Asian 
Survey 56, no. 6 (2019): 1168–93. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.6.1168; Nigel Inkster, “Chinese 
Intelligence in the Cyber Age,” Survival 55, no. 1 (March 2013): 45–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/
00396338.2013.767405. 
21 Inkster, “Chinese Intelligence in the Cyber Age,” 45–66; Jon R. Lindsay, “The Impact of China on 
Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction,” International Security 39, no. 3 (January 2015): 15, https://doi.org/
10.1162/ISEC_a_00189; Lindsay, Cheung, and Reveron, China and Cybersecurity : Espionage, Strategy, 
and Politics in the Digital Domain, 279. 
22 Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), 79–80; Martin Chorzempa, China Needs Better Credit Data to Help 
Consumers, Policy Brief 18-1 (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 
2018): 9, https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/china-needs-better-credit-data-help-consumers; Genia 
Kostka, “China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels of Approval,” New 
Media & Society 21 (2019):1596. https://doi.org/10.1177/146144481926402. 
23 Valeriano, Jensen, and Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion, 
146–47; Jon R. Lindsay, “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction.” 
24 Jinghan Zeng, Tim Stevens, and Yaru Chen, “China’s Solution to Global Cyber Governance: 
Unpacking the Domestic Discourse of ‘Internet Sovereignty,” Politics & Policy 45, no. 3 (June 2017): 432–
64, https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12202. 
6 
exist within China, the latter compulsory to all citizens and businesses.25 Some scholars 
observe that the social credit system was introduced by the government to regain the trust 
of the people.26 Others suggest the government introduced the system to monitor and 
control behavior of both the Chinese population and business.27 Mareike Ohlberg contends 
that while the Chinese accept social credit, they remain skeptical of the organizations 
responsible for capturing and managing the data.28 Scholarly research conducted by Genia 
Kostka concludes that China’s social credit system provides a means of controlling the 
population and preventing dissent, a tactic widely accepted and supported by the population 
and not seen as a coercive.29 China’s reliance on the internet to control the population and 
in turn preserve regime stability, presents a potential vulnerability for exploitation to be 
explored in this research.  
Through the internal internet regulation enabled by the Great Firewall, the CCP 
controls cyberspace not only to maintain the regime’s legitimacy but to prevent Western 
influence and destabilizing ideas. As argued by Zeng et al. the regulation of the internet to 
preserve regime stability prevents civil uprising of the population and dissent.30 Scholarly 
research also suggests that the Great Firewall was implemented by the Chinese government 
to create a controlled information environment, which regulates information flow in and 
out of the country.31 Elizabeth Economy argues that although the regime has succeeded in 
regulating the flow of internet traffic into China through the Great Firewall, users can still 
 
25 Chorzempa, China Needs Better Credit Data to Help Consumers, 1–9. 
26 Martin Chorzempa, Paul Triolo, and Samm Sacks, “China’s Social Credit System: A Mark of 
Progress or a Threat to Privacy?” Policy Brief 18-14 (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, June 2018): 11 https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/chinas-social-credit-system-mark-
progress-or -threat-privacy. 
27 Kostka, “China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels of Approval,” 
1–31. 
28 Mareike Ohlberg, Shazeda Ahmed, and Bertram Lang, “Central Planning, Local Experiments. The 
Complex Implementation of China’s Social Credit System,” MERICS China Monitor (December 12, 2017): 
43, https://www.merics.org/en/microsite/china-monitor/central-planning-local-experiments 
29 Kostka, “China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels of Approval,” 
1–31. 
30 Zeng, Stevens, and Chen, “China’s Solution to Global Cyber Governance,” 437. 
31 Zixue Tai, The Internet in China (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 102–3. 
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bypass it utilizing illegal Virtual Private Networks (VPN) that are now banned in China.32 
China’s focus on using the Great Firewall to preserve ideology and maintain domestic 
stability may present a vulnerability, which is further explored in this research. Similarly, 
Beijing exploits cyberspace to maintain regime legitimacy through denial-of-service 
attacks from the Great Cannon. Although scholarly research suggests that the Great Cannon 
was developed by China as an external political tool to protect against the potential 
undermining of the regime,33 Jon R. Lindsay provides an alternate view, that the Great 
Cannon is used by China to maintain its image and silence dissidents abroad.34 Echoing 
this view, Economy argues the underlying purpose of the Great Cannon is to execute denial 
of service attacks aimed at webpages that do not promote favorable information on 
China.35 Such attacks, as argued by Nigel Inkster, are rudimentary and unsophisticated, 
and are not an area of focus of this research.36 
With consensus that China poses a significant threat to the national security and 
global supremacy of the United States, and that regime stability and cyberspace are integral 
factors in the rise of China, this thesis argues that cyber operations provide the United 
States a non-escalatory approach to achieving its strategic objectives. Therefore, further 
research and analysis is required to explore inherent cyberspace vulnerabilities in China’s 
social credit system and the Great Firewall to determine potential exploitation opportunities 
available to the U.S. Government.  
B. APPROACH 
This thesis identifies key vulnerabilities in China’s cyberspace that can be exploited 
by the United States to preserve its strategic advantage. Such vulnerabilities are identified 
through a case study analysis of two Chinese cyber applications: the social credit system 
and the Great Firewall. These two applications were selected because of their use in 
 
32 Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State, 74–75. 
33 Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State, 75. 
34 Lindsay, “The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction.” 
35 Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State, 75. 
36 Nigel Inkster, China’s Cyber Power (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). 
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promoting Chinese regime stability and geopolitical influence, they are owned and 
controlled by the state, and they represent internal (domestic) and external (global) 
cyberspace. 
Utilizing cyber-kill chain theory and academic research on China’s cybersecurity 
system, this thesis explains conceptually the vulnerabilities identified by the two case 
studies.37 The thesis also provides a vulnerability assessment of each case study to identify 
targets of opportunity that can be exploited with other forms of statecraft. Moreover, the 
targets of opportunity identified through the vulnerability assessment are analyzed via a 
heuristic thought experiment to develop courses of action and test the hypothesis. Finally, 
analysis of the courses of action to determine the likelihood of achieving desired end state. 
C. FINDINGS 
This thesis finds that the Chinese social credit system and the Great Firewall are 
vulnerable to cyber operations. Specifically, the examination reveals that U.S. offensive 
cyber operations aimed at disruption of China’s social credit system, in concert with 
traditional forms of statecraft, may undermine regime stability. Furthermore, offensive 
cyber operations (phishing) aimed at infiltrating the Great Firewall, when combined with 
traditional forms of statecraft, may induce dissent within the Chinese population. While 
historical analysis shows U.S. cyber disruption and phishing operations vis-à-vis China 
have been non-escalatory, these operations have not been directed at the Chinese 
population. As such, it is not certain that the offensive cyber operations proposed in this 
thesis which target this core element of CCP legitimacy and regime stability will remain 
non-escalatory. Accordingly, U.S. whole-of-government planning would need to consider 
the strategic environment, timing, posture, and preparedness to ensure an appropriate level 
of readiness to react to possible Chinese escalation in response to the cyber operations 
proposed hereafter. It must be reiterated that these propositions are consistent with the 2018 
DoD Cyber Strategy of persistent engagement. 
 
37 Tarun Yadav, “Technical Aspects of Cyber Kill Chain,” arXiv.org 536 (June 2016): 438–52, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22915-7_40. 
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D. OUTLINE OF THESIS 
In the following chapter, this thesis discusses the theoretical framework of the U.S. 
National Security and Cyber Strategies, China’s reliance on cyberspace, and U.S. 
cyberspace operations as a non-escalatory approach vis-à-vis China. Chapter III provides 
an overview of the purpose and vulnerabilities of the social credit system and exploitation 
actions to disrupt it and influence Chinese regime instability. Chapter IV explores  
the purpose and vulnerabilities of the Great Firewall and exploitation actions to disrupt  
it and promote dissent among the Chinese population. Through the opposite lenses of  
China and the United States, Chapter V presents the considerations pertaining to cyber 
operations targeting Chinese cyberspace. Lastly, Chapter VI presents conclusions and 










II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter presents the theoretical foundation of the claim that China’s reliance 
on cyberspace presents a potential vulnerability that the United States should exploit to 
maintain strategic advantage. Firstly, to validate this claim, the chapter relies on analysis 
of the current U.S. National Security and Cyber Strategies to examine the U.S. approach 
and actions to the threat China poses to U.S. hegemony. Secondly, the chapter presents 
scholarly observations that support this claim by illustrating China’s rise is reliant on 
cyberspace, and the vulnerabilities that this reliance on cyberspace has created. Finally, the 
use of cyber operations as a non-escalatory approach is explored to illustrate how the 
United States can employ this tool to maintain strategic advantage over China. 
A. UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
China represents a clear challenge to U.S. hegemony and the liberal world order. 
The 2018 U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission outlined the impact of 
China’s strong economic growth, expanding military reach, and geopolitical influence 
relative to U.S. power and global stability.38 This is echoed in the 2018 U.S. National 
Security Strategy, which stated that, along with Russia, China is a threat to “American 
power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity”39 
and that China’s theft of intellectual property is a direct threat to the U.S. economy.40 To 
address these threats, the United States released the U.S. National Defense and Cyber 
Strategies in 2018, which urge the use of all elements of statecraft, both in and through the 
cyber domain. The  U.S. DoD Cyber Strategy took this one step further and for the first 
time publicly endorsed the use of persistent engagement cyber operations to “defend 
forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls 
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39 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington DC: White House, December 2017), 2, 
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below the level of armed conflict.”41 This tactic represents another lever to complement 
the current U.S. strategy on China, and serves as the motivation for this study. 
A key objective of U.S. National Security Strategy is the preservation of the 
primacy of the United States in the global system. In the diplomatic sphere, the preservation 
of U.S. primacy requires the United States to address China’s emergence as a global power 
through reinforcement of the United States’ alliance system. The current U.S. America 
First Foreign Policy advanced by the Trump Administration promotes a transactional 
approach, leading to a shortfall in global governance and, quite possibly, to a less stable 
system. The current approach, in turn, has allowed China to address this shortfall and use 
economic influence to promote its security interests at the global level. Cases in point are 
China’s expanding presence within Africa through foreign aid, peacekeeping operations, 
economic and trade agreements, and infrastructure projects in Djibouti;42 in Asia this 
increased influence is evidenced by the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) to compete with the U.S.-led World Bank,43 and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is aimed at counterbalancing U.S. promotion of 
democracy abroad.44 This perceived shift in power from the United States to China has 
contributed to increased instability worldwide and a decrease in confidence of the United 
States as hegemon. A 2017 Pew Global Poll of 25 countries indicated that 70 percent do 
not have confidence in President Trump’s handling of international issues, while 70 percent 
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see China as having more influence in the world over the past decade.45 In addition to these 
traditional forms of statecraft, the United States has an opportunity to employ cyber 
operations. Such operations could be used in tandem with diplomatic efforts as a non-
escalatory approach to bolster current U.S. diplomatic efforts to reinforce U.S. commitment 
to global stability, as well as to counter China’s influence. 
Other forms of national power, particularly in the informational domain, enable the 
U.S. to maintain its global power base. The United States must maintain technological 
supremacy in this domain and not enable China, which possesses the capability, intent, and 
political will to challenge the United States as the world leader in innovation and 
competitiveness.46 China’s rise has occurred based on an economic development program 
centered on technological innovation, information and communications technologies 
(ICT), and AI.47 China uses these same technologies to advance its interests and global 
influence by facilitating economic and political expansion.48 At the core of China’s ICT 
technology and expansion are the state-controlled companies of ZTE and Huawei, whose 
theft of U.S. intellectual property has enabled their emergence as technology giants.49  
Furthermore, China’s AI heavyweights Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (BAT) have invested 
heavilywith an estimated 10.5 billion USD in 2017in U.S. Silicon Valley technology 
companies.50 The United States has addressed these coercive tactics and trends by securing 
U.S. intellectual property (IP) through the 2015 U.S.–China cyber agreement,51 the 2018 
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National and DoD Cyber Strategies, and the current push by the Trump Administration and 
the U.S. Congress to ban leading Chinese tech brands within the United States. The U.S. 
administration has also reduced Chinese investment in U.S. tech companies by 79 percent 
through U.S.–China trade sanctions52 and is using the judicial system to hold Chinese tech 
company executives to account, as is evidenced by the U.S. extradition request of Huawei 
Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou in December 2018.53 These actions, however, 
have not dissuaded China from stealing U.S. IP or impeded the former’s rise. Accordingly, 
cyber operations as a non-escalatory approach present an opportunity for the United States 
to support current U.S. information efforts to address China’s rise. 
Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained military superiority 
globally. The rapid expansion and modernization of China’s military, as well as its power 
projection capability, challenges this U.S. superiority, both in the Indo-Pacific and 
globally. China’s maritime reach and the projection of its maritime power have expanded 
significantly, through the establishment of military bases and multipurpose ports in 
Djibouti and leasing of ports in Sri Lanka and Australia.54 China’s recent militarization of 
the South China Sea provides a means for China to project power deep into the Western 
Pacific and could impede freedom of maritime maneuver within one of the busiest sea-
lanes in the world, preventing access to the maritime commons and creating regional 
instability. One way the United States and allied countries challenge China’s territorial 
water claims and militarization of the South China Sea has been through Freedom of 
Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea.55 Although the United States’ 
commitment to these regions remains evident with U.S. military bases in Djibouti and 
 
52 Fannin, “China to U.S. Tech Investment Plunges 79% to Lowest Level in 7 Years amid DC 
Crackdown.” 
53 Inkster, “The Huawei Affair and China’s Technology Ambitions.” 
54 Steve George and Brad Lendon, “‘Weaponizing Capital’: U.S. Worries over China’s Expanding 
Role in Africa,” CNN, August 24, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/09/asia/djibouti-port-china-us-intl/
index.html. 
55 Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossiter, “Indo Pacific: Regional Dynamics in the 21st Century’s New 




Australia, China continues to exert influence globally, through its Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) investment and infrastructure, foreign military bases, and a blue water navy. 
Therefore, cyber operations as a non-escalatory approach present an opportunity for the 
United States to support current U.S. military efforts and address China’s great power 
ambitions.  
At the same time, to preserve its global power, the United States needs to consider 
its economic relationship with China. In addressing China’s economic rise and ensuing 
actions in cyberspace, the economic interdependencies between the two nations is a key 
consideration for the United States as it seeks to avoid potential conflict and power 
imbalance.56  Indeed, China’s influence may have expanded in the absence of a U.S.-led 
Trans Pacific Partnership,57 but the imposition of trade tariffs by the United States in 
response to China’s IP theft is a clear signal of U.S. resolve to protect its global primacy 
and economic interests. Moreover, cyber operations as a non-escalatory approach present 
an opportunity for Washington to support current U.S. economic statecraft addressing 
China’s rise. 
B. CHINA AND CYBERSPACE 
As noted earlier, scholarly observations about China’s reliance on cyberspace and 
digital technologies to achieve its position of power on the world stage provide the 
theoretical foundation of this study. In this section, an examination of the role of 
cyberspace in China’s preservation of regime stability and expanded global influence is 
conducted to illustrate this link. 
Regime survival is fundamental to the CCP. The Chinese government preserves 
domestic stability by controlling the information the population consumes.58 China views 
ideological threats from Western influence as a threat to domestic stability and seeks to 
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control information flowing in and out of China. Information control not only preserves its 
regime but expands China’s interests and influence abroad.59 Two key cyber capabilities 
are employed by Beijing to achieve regime stability and prevent Western ideological 
infiltration: its social credit system and the Great Firewall. The former launched in 2015 to 
encourage people and companies to monitor, rate, and control behavior and aims to 
promote the moral values and trustworthiness of China’s 1.4 billion people by 2020.60 The 
other cyber capability, the Great Firewall, regulates information flow in and out of the 
country to create an information-controlled environment.61 Yet, the prioritization of 
regime stability at all costs has resulted in China having poor cybersecurity standards and 
defenses.62 Moreover, China’s reliance on key cyber capabilities (namely, the social credit 
system and the Great Firewall) to maintain regime security and its associated poor 
cybersecurity protocols present vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the United States 
through cyber operations intended to influence the Chinese population and the legitimacy 
of the regime.63 
Beyond China’s borders, Beijing use of the internet propels China’s geopolitical 
influence. China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative, in particular, has enabled China’s 
technological expansion and dominance into Africa and Asia.64 The DSR and its 
associated ICT infrastructure have resulted in the Great Firewall and associated normative 
aspects (censorship) of this infrastructure creeping outward.65 The cheaper Chinese 
products developed by companies such as Alibaba, ZTE, and Huawei have enabled those 
companies to establish networks and secure e-payment, cloud computing, and 5G network 
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construction contracts in Africa and South East Asia, edging out their U.S. competitors.66 
Furthermore, South East Asian countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia are attracted to 
China’s authoritarian model of information control and that state’s ability to expand its 
digital economy by controlling and regulating access to data.67 The DSR infrastructure in 
fact provides the Chinese regime vast amounts of government, financial, and personal data 
on these countries under China’s strictly controlled and censored cyber governance 
system.68 Moreover, China’s ability to exploit embedded vulnerabilities within the 5G 
infrastructure provides that state with an extended surveillance advantage over not only 
Chinese nationals abroad but over all users of the technology.69 As just discussed, China 
relies heavily on cyberspace to garner technological advantage over the United States and 
subsequently to increase China’s geopolitical influence, which threatens U.S. hegemony. 
Nonetheless, this dependence presents a potential vulnerability that can be exploited by the 
United States to influence China and maintain a strategic advantage for global influence. 
C. CYBER OPERATIONS 
The U.S. use of cyber operations as a non-escalatory approach provides the 
theoretical framework to support this study’s claim.  
The United States DoD defines cyberspace as “a global domain within the 
information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information 
technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications 
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”70 As stated 
previously, the U.S. DoD now sanctions the use of offensive cyber capabilities to achieve 
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U.S. national and strategic interests.71 Furthermore, Offensive Cyberspace Operations 
(OCO), as defined by the DoD, is the projection of “power by the application of force in 
and through cyberspace” operating below the threshold of armed conflict (grey zone) that 
may lead to escalatory responses, to prevent adversaries access to cyberspace through 
denial effects (degradation, disruption or destruction) or to manipulate information or 
information systems of an adversary within the cyber domain to generate effects within the 
physical domain.72 Complementing this strategy is research conducted by Valeriano et al. 
on the utility of cyber coercion.73 Coercion as defined by Robert J. Art and Kelly M. 
Greenhill is the ability to get an actor to do something it does not want to do via 
compellence (to change a target’s behavior) or deterrence (to prevent a target from 
changing behavior).74  
In many cases coercive cyber strategies can be employed to signal intent through 
demonstrating power and resolve, without resorting to kinetic or conventional force or 
escalation.75 This is reflected in the 2014 Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset 
(DCID) and associated analysis of cyber incidents, which found that cyber operations 
produce limited escalatory responses within cyberspace and avoided military escalation.76 
An example of this is the 2007 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the Estonian 
parliament, banks, and media outlets that significantly impacted that country’s governance 
and financial activities for three weeks, but did not result in kinetic actions.77 Another 
example is the Iranian 2011–2013 DDoS attack against U.S. banks in response to the 
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alleged Stuxnet attack.78 This cyber-attack successfully communicated Iran’s resolve (and 
Tehran’s displeasure about Stuxnet) to the United States without escalation or 
brinkmanship. On the other hand, Ben Buchanan provides an opposing view to Valeriano 
et al., maintaining that when they expand their cybersecurity and cyber defenses, states 
may unintentionally signal escalation,79 while Joseph S. Nye proposes that it is a state’s 
consideration of the repercussion of cyber operations that prevents it from using its full 
cyber arsenal, which also indicates the usefulness of cyber operations for political 
signaling.80 Furthermore, increased effectiveness of this cyber signaling can be achieved 
when an operation is combined with other elements of statecraft.81 This view is further 
supported by Maness, Valeriano, and Jensen’s DCID Version 1.5, which presents that this 
concept of rival states employing both cyber operations and conventional actions of 
statecraft (diplomatic, economic, and military), as coded by the Conflict and Mediation 
Event Observations (CAMEO) scale, results in military threat 19 percent of the time, 
display of force 20 percent of the time, and use of force 37 percent of time, and from a 
U.S.–China perspective, military threat 10 percent of the time, display of force 4 percent 
of time, and use of force 14 percent of time.82 
The core tenet of this thesis is that cyber operations offer a non-escalatory approach 
to enhance the implementation of the U.S. strategy on China and complement other forms 
of statecraft to promote strategic advantage over China. The U.S. DoD has defined the 
forms of cyber operations that remain below the threshold of armed conflict and include 
defined periods of disruption to internet services, propaganda, and deliberate/time-based 
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disruption, disabling, defacement or interference of communications and government 
webpages.83 These elements of cyber operations, particularly cyber disruption of the social 
credit system and the Great Firewall, can be employed to coerce China and influence 
regime instability. Of note, the use of propaganda and defacement of CCP webpages can 
enable targeted Information Operation campaigns to undermine CCP legitimacy, promote 
Western ideology, or create political disobedience within the population. The potential 
effectiveness of such cyber operations is analyzed in the following chapters using Maness, 
Valeriano, and Jensen’s DCID Version 1.5 to ascertain the likelihood of China’s 
concession or escalation. 
China’s reliance on the social credit system and the Great Firewall to preserve 
regime stability presents a vulnerability that may be exploited by the United States in and 
through the cyber domain in order to maintain or advance strategic advantage. The next 
chapter analyzes the social credit system to ascertain its specific vulnerabilities and present 
possible exploitation opportunities to influence regime instability.  
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III. CHINA’S SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM 
Regime stability is a key element of China’s rise. The preservation of regime 
stability and the CCP’s narrative for the right to lead motivates the country’s uniform 
ideology and political obedience, as the “disintegration of a regime often starts from the 
ideological area.”84 The maintenance of uniform ideology and political obedience requires 
the prevention of Western influence and foreign ideas from infiltrating Chinese society. 
The legitimization of Confucianism in both virtuous rule and meeting the needs of the 
people, and their incorporation into the CCP political culture, promotes uniform ideology 
from within both the CCP and society, and underpins Xi’s Chinese Dream to reclaim global 
power.85  
One of the platforms the CCP uses to build an ideologically pure and politically 
obedient society is the social credit system. This chapter analyzes the social credit system 
as part of a test of the following hypothesis: 
H1. Cyber operations or the threat of such operations combined with traditional 
forms of statecraft aimed at disrupting the social credit system will undermine Chinese 
regime stability. 
First, this chapter articulates the importance of the social credit system in 
maintaining the CCP’s regime stability by preserving its ideology through the use of carrots 
and sticks to control of the population’s behavior, and promoting the CCP’s legitimacy by 
securing the population’s trust and acceptance. Second, the cyber vulnerabilities of the 
social credit system are assessed to identify targets of opportunity that can be exploited to 
undermine Chinese regime stability. Third, these targets of opportunity are analyzed via a 
heuristic thought experiment to develop Courses of Action (COA) to test the hypothesis. 
Finally, analysis of the COA is offered to determine the likelihood of creating regime 
instability. 
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A. THE SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM EXPLAINED 
The Chinese government launched the social credit system in 2015 to encourage 
people and companies to monitor, rate, and control behavior that promotes CCP-endorsed 
Confucian values and trustworthiness.86 The social credit system comprises both a 
government-led model, which is compulsory for all companies and citizens, as well as a 
voluntary commercial model.87 The commercial social credit system consists of eight 
companies, the main being Alibaba’s Sesame Credit and Tencent’s Credit.88 Through the 
collection of behavioral data from Chinese citizens’ financial transactions and social 
exchanges, the social credit system assesses citizens’ trustworthiness.89 All data collected 
by both government and commercial companies is uploaded to the Chinese National Credit 
Information Sharing Platform.90  
The social credit system promises to “allow the trustworthy to roam everywhere 
under heaven while making it hard for the discredited to take a single step.”91 In line with 
Confucian values, the social credit system assesses an individual’s financial, economic, 
and socio-political behaviors and assigns a score that reflects how well the individual 
displays CCP-endorsed behavior.92 To encourage trustworthy behavior, the social credit 
system awards points and penalizes poor behavior by subtracting points.93 Poor behavior 
or traits (low scores) may result in the loss of privileges such as travel opportunities or 
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employment, while trustworthy behaviors (high scores) will be rewarded with incentives 
such as bank loans or investment opportunities.94 The award and removal of points within 
the social credit system is not centrally regulated by the CCP; rather, each individual 
commercial and government company is provided complete autonomy over protocols and 
standards for assessing trustworthiness. In the absence of uniform standards and 
governmental regulation, awarding and removal of points within the system varies among 
social credit providers, and at present, no avenue exists for individuals to appeal or repair 
social credit scores impacting an individual’s ability to lead a normal life or pursue business 
interests.95  
The social credit system, in fact, is far more than a mere financial interpretation of 
citizens’ spending habits.96 The Chinese government views an individual’s social life as 
intrinsically linked to one’s financial life; consequently, the social credit system provides 
insight into an individual’s daily financial transactions and social exchanges.97 By 
incorporating an individual’s social exchanges, the social credit system is not only 
assessing the attributes of the individual, it is also assessing his or her social network.98 
The inclusion of his or her social network or social ties in developing an individual’s social 
credit score encourages intra social control and the formation of dense social networks.99  
Intra social control promotes a trustworthy society through collective punishment. 
Chinese citizens participating in the social credit system increase their social credit score 
by forming dense (large) networks with other high scoring individuals and by policing the 
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group’s behaviors.100 To preserve their social credit score and by extension their status in 
society and associated financial and material benefits, Chinese citizens adhere to the social 
obligations and restrictive behaviors required by the social credit system. This adherence 
at the individual level and societal level for promotion and policing of CCP-endorsed 
behavior reduces untrustworthy behaviors.101 In addition, this delegation of behavioral 
policing to the societal level and propaganda increases citizens’ trust and confidence in the 
social credit system and, by extension, in the CCP. 
Through the use of propaganda appealing to the cultural and moral components 
embraced by the population, the Chinese government increases the legitimacy and 
acceptance of the social credit system.102 Limited empirical research exists pertaining to 
public approval of China’s social credit system. A 2018 case study based on a three- month 
nationwide survey of 350,000 Chinese mobile application and website users between the 
ages of 14 and 65 found that China’s social credit system is well received and supported 
by the Chinese population, who view this as a method of creating a better society, not a 
violation of data privacy or social manipulation.103  From this research, Kostka concluded 
that respondents who “approve of the SCSs [social credit systems] tend to be older, higher-
income, male, more highly-educated, and living in an urban area,”104 and that social credit 
system approval is higher among individuals who are regular social media users.105 Many 
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respondents interviewed in the survey, however, did not realize that the system assigned 
both incentives and punishments for behavior.106  
Despite this imperfect  understanding of the system, the Chinese population has 
expressed high levels of confidence and trust in the social credit system. Armed with the 
knowledge that the Chinese population trusts the social credit system, the United States 
can create dissent and political unrest among the population through cyber and information 
operations that could in turn undermine regime stability. 
The social credit system represents an integral component of maintaining CCP 
regime stability. Initial analysis of the system indicates that all data pertaining to the social 
credit system is stored at the centralized National Credit Information Sharing Platform 
repository. It is also apparent that Sesame Credit and Tencent Credit are the main 
commercial social credit providers, and the Chinese population displays high levels of trust 
and confidence in both government and commercial social credit providers. These factors 
are considered as potential vulnerabilities using the first two steps of the cyber-kill chain 
framework: reconnaissance and intrusion. Exploitation of the vulnerabilities identified 
during the vulnerability assessment are then proposed through a heuristic thought 
experiment. 
B. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
This section will now utilize the cyber kill chain theory to conduct a vulnerability 
assessment of the social credit system.  
1. Reconnaissance  
The reconnaissance phase or step can identify key cyberspace elements of the social 
credit system that warrant further investigation in the intrusion phase or step, which 
identifies specific cyber vulnerabilities. 
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a. National Credit Information Sharing Platform 
The backbone of the social credit system is the National Credit Information Sharing 
Platform.107 China’s National Development Reform Commission, located in Beijing, 
employs 890 people108 and is responsible for the implementation, development, and 
security protocols of this platform.109  Open source analysis indicates an absence of 
regulatory standards and cybersecurity practices pertaining to the National Credit 
Information Sharing Platform, which increases the vulnerability of the social credit system 
to cyber-attack and security breaches.110 The vulnerability of this platform is further 
increased due to the centralized data structure approach, which stores all data to a single 
physical or geographical location.111 Furthermore, the social credit system utilizes 
internet-based applications such as smart phones, which have low cybersecurity standards. 
By 2020, 1.4 billion112 of these devices will be connected to the network, increasing the 
risk of cyber-attacks and security breaches.113  
b. Sesame Credit 
Sesame Credit, one of two key commercial providers of China’s social credit 
system, is owned by China’s largest online commerce company Alibaba (located in 
Hangzhou and employing 101,958 individuals).114 It pulls data from Alibaba mobile  
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platform services Alipay (400 million users) and Taobao (617 million users) to produce a 
social credit score between 350 and 750 based on individuals’ financial and social 
transactions.115 As noted previously, there is no regulatory standard on what constitutes 
trustworthy or responsible behavior. Within Sesame Credit, purchasing diapers is 
considered responsible behavior and points are awarded for this activity; on the other hand, 
playing video games for a “long” period (an exact time frame is not provided) is considered 
poor behavior and points are deducted for such behavior.116  In 2013, Alibaba signed a 
cooperation agreement with Sina Corp (operating in Beijing with 63,000 employees)117 to 
enable data sharing between the two company’s social media platforms Taobao and Sina 
Weibo. This agreement provides Alibaba with an 18 percent share in Sina Weibo and 
provides Sesame Credit data access to more than 416 million users on China’s second most 
popular online social media platform.118  
c. Tencent Credit 
Tencent Credit is a key commercial provider of China’s social credit system. 
Tencent Credit, a subsidiary of Tencent, employs 54,000 people and is a located in the 
Nanshan District of China.119 Tencent Credit utilizes China’s largest online social media 
platform WeChat (1.08 billion users) and online payment service WeChat pay (600 million 
users) to assess the trustworthiness of citizens and assigns a rating between 300 and 850, 
basing the score on personal consumption behavior and an individual’s ability to keep 
obligations through analysis of social media interactions and financial transactions.120  
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d. Findings 
The commercial social credit systems Sesame Credit and Tencent Credit rely on 
online mobile applications, accessed primarily via smart phones, for the provision of data. 
Of China’s 1.4 billion smartphone users, approximately 73 percent use Android phones.121  
In addition the major population and technology centers Tianjin, Qingado, Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Beijing, and Chongquing have been identified as having the weakest instance 
of individual cybersecurity.122 The proximity of China’s National Development Reform 
Commission, Sesame Credit and Tencent Credit organizations, and their associated 
employees to these weak cybersecurity areas provides potential targets for exploitation. 
The social credit system’s reliance on mobile payment applications Alipay and WeChat 
Pay, and social media applications Taobao, Sina Weibo and WeChat, as well as the 
Android operating system warrants further intrusion vulnerability investigation.  
2. Intrusion 
The vulnerability assessment of the mobile payment applications and social media 
applications identified in the reconnaissance phase is now conducted using the U.S. 
Government National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The NVD is an open source database 
that exposes unique and verified software vulnerabilities, assigns a unique identifier  
(CVE) to each vulnerability, and assesses the severity of the vulnerability using the 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).123  The 2019 NVD assessment of Alipay, 
WeChat Pay, WeChat, Taobao, Sina Weibo, and the Android Operating System is depicted 
in Table 1.124  
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Table 1. NVD Assessment. Adapted from National Vulnerability Database (2019). 
Application ID Published CVSS Severity Vulnerability 
Alipay 
CVE-2019-
9762 13-Mar-19 9.8 Critical 
Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
Allows unauthorized modification 
Allows disruption of service 
CVE-2019-
9212 27-Feb-19 9.8 Critical 
Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
Allows unauthorized modification 
Allows disruption of service 
CVE-2019-
6805 25-Jan-19 9.9 Critical 
Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
Allows unauthorized modification 




9761 13-Mar-19 7.5 High Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
CVE-2019-
5312 4-Jan-19 9.8 Critical 
Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
Allows unauthorized modification 
Allows disruption of service 
We Chat 
CVE-2019-
11561 23-May-19 6.5 Medium Allows unauthorized modification 
CVE-2019-
11419 14-May-19 5.5 Medium 
Allows disruption of service 
Victim must voluntarily interact with attack 
mechanism 
CVE-2019-
9761 13-Mar-19 7.5 Medium Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
CVE-2019-
1702 11-Mar-19 6.1 Medium 
Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
Victim must voluntarily interact with attack 
mechanism 
CVE-2019-
1668 24-Jan-19 6.1 Medium 
Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
Victim must voluntarily interact with attack 
mechanism 
CVE-2019-
20731 16-Jan-19 6.1 Medium 
Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
Victim must voluntarily interact with attack 
mechanism 
CVE-2019-
5312 4-Jan-19 9.8 Critical 
Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
Allows unauthorized modification 
Allows disruption of service 
Android OS  
CVE-2019-
11419 14-May-19 5.5 Medium 
Victim must voluntarily interact with attack 
mechanism 
Allows disruption of service 
CVE-2019-
8919 18-Feb-19 7.5 High Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
CVE-2018-
9583 11-Feb-19 9.8 Critical 
Allows unauthorized disclosure of information 
Allows unauthorized modification 
Allows disruption of service 
Sina Weibo Nil 
Taobao Nil 
The NVD assessment of the applications utilized by Sesame Credit and Tencent 
Credit identified several common vulnerabilities ranging in severity from Medium to 
Critical, which allow disruption of service, unauthorized modification or unauthorized 
disclosure of information. Therefore, the presence of these vulnerabilities within these 
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applications provides reasonable grounds to infer that applications supporting China’s 
social credit system are vulnerable to cyber operations.  
C. THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
The social credit system has been identified as vulnerable to cyber operations. The 
purpose of this section is to evaluate the use of non-escalatory cyber operations or the threat 
of such operations to exploit these vulnerabilities to undermine regime stability. The 
evaluation is reflected in Table 2, which is subsequently explained in more detail.
Table 2. Cyber Operation Evaluation Social Credit System 
Each target identified in the vulnerability assessment is listed in column 1, and a 
non-escalatory cyber operation (disruption, website defacement, and propaganda) has been 
selected in the second column. The objective of the cyber operation (population dissent or 
political unrest) is listed in the third, and a prediction of the level of influence on the 
population (low, medium, high) is shown in the fourth column. The prediction of the level 
of influence on the population is determined by level of trust in the target application 
and type of cyber operation as per Table 3. The effect of these cyber-attacks on regime 
stability is assessed in the final column under CCP concession, with an allocation of 
1 indicating a concession and 0 resulting in no concession. Concession for this study is 
defined as the CCP’s acknowledgment that the cyber operation will cause popular dissent 
or political unrest and may threaten regime stability, which is viewed as providing the 
United States with coercive power and strategic advantage. The column to the right of the 











NCISP Disruption Population Dissent High 1 Low 1 Low 1 Low 0 Low 
Alipay Disruption Population Dissent High 1 Low 1 Low 1 Low 0 Low 
We Chat Pay Disruption Population Dissent High 1 Low 1 Low 1 Low 0 Low 
We Chat  Disruption Population Dissent High 1 Low 1 Low 1 Low 0 Low 
Android OS Disruption Population Dissent Low 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 
We Chat  Defacement Political Unrest Med 0 Low 0 Low 1 Low 0 Low 
We Chat  Propaganda Political Unrest Med 0 Low 0 Low 1 Low 0 Low 
Android OS Propaganda Political Unrest Low 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 
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score indicates the likelihood of escalation (low, medium, high) by the CCP in response to 
the cyber-attack. Concession scores are based on historical events as coded and recorded 
in the DCID 1.5.125
Table 3. Population Influence 






Trust Level  
Cyber Disruption Low High 
Cyber Defacement Low Medium 
Cyber Propaganda Low Medium 
D. ANALYSIS 
From Table 2, it can be ascertained that cyber disruption operations targeting 
NCISP, Alipay, WeChat Pay and WeChat will prevent an estimated 1.08 billion users 
access to trusted payment applications, social networking sites, and social credit scores for 
a short period of time. This disruption will cause immense frustration as the users are 
unable to conduct transactions and interactions that are an essential part of daily life, and 
rolling disruption campaigns will lead to popular dissent. The effectiveness of the 
disruption campaigns could be further increased by targeting users located within the areas 
of low cybersecurity (Tianjin, Qingado, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Beijing, and Chongquing), 
which are also highly populated. Due to the high levels of trust and number of users in 
NCISP, Alipay, WeChat Pay, and WeChat, it is forecast that disruption operations targeting 
these applications have a high influence rating on the population and as such will create 
popular dissent. Therefore, it is assessed that the mere issuance of a threat of a cyber 
disruption attack targeting the social credit system will result in CCP concession. The 
coercive power of this threatened disruption attack would be further increased upon 
physical execution as well as through diplomacy. Diplomatic efforts in this scenario may 
focus on promoting U.S.-owned companies, technology, and applications as a trusted 
secure alternative. 
125 Maness, Valeriano, and Jensen, “The Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset, Version 1.5.” 
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Defacement and propaganda campaigns targeting the social media application 
WeChat have an average likelihood of promoting political unrest within China. Website 
defacement of the WeChat social media application provides an outlet to disperse 
unfiltered and uncensored news to the Chinese population. This news could be highlighting 
China’s human rights violations such as Tiananmen Square footage, 2019 Hong Kong 
protests, environmental pollution, high poverty levels, and Western media broadcasts, or 
propaganda campaigns to promote Western ideology. As this type of cyber operation has 
a temporal aspect, it is assessed that the coercive power of either the threat or the actual 
execution of a cyber propaganda and website defacement attack will not produce an 
immediate concession from the CCP. However, a CCP concession is possible when the 
propaganda and website attack is executed in concert with U.S. diplomatic efforts, as it 
increases the credibility of the cyber operation and enhances the attack’s influence on the 
population.  
The Android OS is susceptible to disruption of service and defacement operations. 
Nevertheless, due to the lack of empirical evidence pertaining to the level of trust among 
the Chinese population in these systems, it is not viable to assess the likelihood of such 
attacks influencing the Chinese population, and therefore a low level has been allocated for 
this option. Due to the low level of perceived population influence from cyber-attacks 
targeting the Android OS system, no concessions from the CCP have been forecast. 
Furthermore, as this is a U.S.-owned application the implementation or use of offensive 
cyber operations in this context does not meet the intent of the National Cyber Strategy of 
the United States. 
Based on the analysis provided in this chapter, the hypothesis presented at the outset 
of this chapterH1. Cyber operations combined with traditional forms of statecraft aimed 
at disrupting China’s social credit system will undermine Chinese regime stabilityis 
upheld.  
The next chapter continues the analysis of Chinese cyberspace vulnerabilities, 
focusing on the Great Firewall to identify targets of opportunity that can be exploited in 
order to promote dissent within the Chinese population.  
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IV. THE GREAT FIREWALL 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the preservation of domestic stability 
underpins China’s rise and secures the CCP’s legitimacy. The CCP views the internet as a 
threat to domestic stability as it can be used to promote political change,126 and possibly, 
to overthrow the Chinese regime.127 Historically, Communist regimes controlled 
information through censorship of movies and books, but today this censorship has 
expanded to technologies such as the internet.128 The Chinese regime achieves this control 
through the Great Firewall, the “most sophisticated IP blocking and content filtering system 
in the world.”129 China’s control of the internet via the Great Firewall is likened to that of 
a sovereign capability, where information is controlled on the Chinese mainland to 
maintain stability and promote propaganda.130 This runs counter to Western views of a 
free and open internet.  
This chapter analyzes the Great Firewall as part of a test of the following 
hypothesis: 
H2 Cyber operations or the threat of such operations, combined with traditional 
forms of statecraft aimed at infiltrating the Great Firewall will promote dissent within the 
Chinese population. 
First this chapter outlines how the CCP uses the Great Firewall to preserve domestic 
stability by controlling access to the internet via legislation and blocking of foreign 
websites and internet applications. Second, a vulnerability assessment of the Great Firewall 
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identifies targets of opportunity that can be exploited with other forms of statecraft. Third, 
the targets of opportunity identified through the vulnerability assessment are analyzed via 
a heuristic thought experiment to develop COAs and test the hypothesis. Finally, each COA 
is analyzed to determine its likelihood of creating popular dissent.  
A. OVERVIEW 
The Chinese internet infrastructure was developed in the early 1980s following 
China’s acknowledgment of the risk the internet could pose to a Communist state. After 
the first email was sent from mainland China in 1987, the Chinese government realized the 
destabilizing potential of the internet and sought to control it.131 In 1996 laws were passed 
that forbid users to establish international connections over the internet without 
government approval,132 and required all Internet Service Providers (ISP) and Internet 
Content Providers (ICP) within China to obtain a license form the China Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology.133  Under the licensing conditions, AI technologies 
are employed to review and remove all unauthorized content China’s internet, and license 
holders are held responsible for the actions of all their internet subscribers.134 In addition, 
state-owned companies provide not only the majority of the internet infrastructure within 
China, but control the sole physical connection to the internet through the Chinese Internet 
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Exchange.135 Thus, the CCP maintains complete autonomy over internet access and 
content within China.136   
Internet content is controlled by blocking foreign websites and applications. 
Initially, the state-sponsored Golden Shield project, implemented in 1998, was designed to 
block foreign internet sites; today, this project is known as the Great Firewall.137 The Great 
Firewall, a centrally located censorship apparatus, inspects traffic flowing through China’s 
Internet Exchanges to determine whether suspicious traffic is being passed, and disrupts 
the connection or handshake between the two servers involved (outcoming and destination) 
on alert of a keyword or IP address not endorsed by the CCP.138 The use of CCP-
sanctioned internet applications is another method the regime uses to achieve internet 
censorship.139 
The CCP ensures that only sanctioned applications are available on the internet. 
Due to restrictions on accessing unauthorized information through the Great Firewall, the 
Chinese population primarily utilizes the internet for shopping, gaming, dating, and social 
media.140  Censorship provided by the Great Firewall ensures that China’s internet citizens 
are discouraged from seeking information and guidance through search engines, leading 
users to utilize social media. As such, Chinese citizens place high levels of trust in social 
media platforms such as WeChat and Weibo when they seek guidance and advice from 
mainstream social media influencers known as Key Opinion Leaders (KOL).141 
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Initial analysis indicates that the Great Firewall relies on the China Internet 
Exchange (CHN_IX) to connect to the internet, and to block access to the foreign internet 
and applications, disrupts the “handshake” between outgoing and destination servers. 
Further, the government of China promotes the use of WeChat and Weibo as trusted 
platforms for Chinese internet citizens to seek guidance and information from KOLs. These 
potential vulnerabilities are assessed using the first two steps of the cyber-kill chain 
frameworkreconnaissance and intrusionto determine the Great Firewall’s 
susceptibility to cyber operations.  
B. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
This section will now utilize the cyber kill chain theory to conduct a vulnerability 
assessment of the Great Firewall.  
1. Reconnaissance 
The reconnaissance phase or step can identify key cyberspace elements of the Great 
Firewall that warrant further investigation in the intrusion phase or step, which identifies 
specific cyber vulnerabilities. 
a. China Internet Exchange (CHN_IX) 
China Internet Exchange (CHN_IX) is an internet exchange provider that connects 
ISPs and ICPs within China.142 As the sole content delivery network, CHN_IX provides 
three connections to the internet, which are located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangxha. 
These connections are referred to as “choke points” as they are the physical interface that 
provides China access to the internet.143  
b. The “Handshake” 
The Great Firewall prevents access to foreign websites and applications by control 
of the “handshake.” The Great Firewall uses Domain Name Server (DNS) cache poisoning, 
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IP address blocking, and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) filtering to inspect traffic passing through the CHN_IX; on identification 
of a key word or banned IP, the Great Firewall breaks the connection by disruption of the 
handshake between the incoming and outgoing servers.144 The handshake operates on a 
90-second cycle to disrupt the connection between the outgoing (China) and incoming 
(International) servers, returning an error message to the user stating the website is 
unavailable.145 To circumvent the handshake monitoring and disruption process, mainland 
Chinese internet users at one time employed Proxy Servers and The Onion Router (TOR), 
which mask IP addresses, and VPNs that encrypt data packets. CCP research and further 
development of the Great Firewall, however, significantly reduced the reliability and 
effectiveness of circumvention methods.146 Yet, research conducted by Zhongjie Wang, 
Yue Cao, Zhiyun Qian, Chengyu Song, and Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy  has proposed that 
as the Great Firewall only inspects outgoing traffic and automatically approves incoming 
traffic, evasion strategies aimed at resynchronizing the handshake are more appropriate 
tools to bypass the Great Firewall.147 
c. Social Media 
Mainland Chinese internet users have adapted to the Great Firewall censoring 
apparatus and view the internet as a platform for socializing rather than a platform for 
research.148 With close to 1.08 billion users on China’s largest online social media 
platform WeChat,149 and more than 416 million users on Weibo,150 it is clear that the 
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Chinese internet population avidly uses social media applications.151 Due to the extensive 
following of these applications, a high volume of information is generated causing Chinese 
social media users to experience information saturation and ignore irrelevant or 
uninteresting posts.152 Moreover, as the Chinese population naturally mistrusts outside 
sources of information, research has found that social media posts not only need to be of 
interest to the user but must also come from a trusted source, namely KOLs.153  Therefore, 
Chinese social media users place high levels of trust in KOLs to provide guidance ranging 
from purchasing decisions to holiday destinations.154 According to a recent Key Opinion 
Leader study, KOLs are “one of the most important marketing tools in China today” 
because of their ability to not only reach, but influence large swaths of the internet 
population.155 With Wei Zhou Xu (aka Timmy Xu), Yu Chun Li and Jun Kai Wan are 
identified as the most powerful KOLs on Chinese social media according to the high levels 
of trust among users and their ability to influence users of Chinese social media 
applications.156 
2. Intrusion 
The vulnerability assessment of the CHN_IX internet exchange points and the 
disruption strategy aimed at resynchronizing the handshake are explored through open 
source and case study analysis. The vulnerability assessment of Sina Weibo and WeChat 
presented earlier in Table 1 concludes that the WeChat application is vulnerable to cyber 
operations. 
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Open source analysis reveals three CHN_IX internet exchange points in China are 
located in Tier 3 data centers, as shown in Table 4.157 Tier 3 data centers have redundant 
and dual-powered servers, network links and storage, and independent sources for cooling 
and power.158 These redundancies ensure Tier 3 data centers are less vulnerable to attacks 
targeting power girds and servers; however, their vulnerability to physical attack 
remains.159  
Table 4. CHN_IX Internet Exchange Points 
CHN_IX Physical Address Physical Security 
Bejing 8 Zhu Yuan 3rd St Tianzhu Free Trade Zone Beijing China Tier 3 Data Center 
Guangzhou 6/F Building G6 Huanan Creative Park, 31 Kefeng Road 
Science Park, Guangzhou, China 
Tier 3 Data Center 
Shanghai Shanghai China Tier 3 Data Center 
b. The “Handshake”
The Great Firewall relies on control of the handshake to prevent Chinese citizens 
accessing foreign websites and applications. The CCP has invested heavily in research and 
development to bolster the Great Firewall. Due to overloading of the system, 2.8 percent 
of all internet traffic bypasses the censorship apparatus on a daily basis.160 While 
commercial VPNs such as Express VPN are still readily available to bypass the internet 
controls, the cost, reliability, and bandwidth requirements of these encryption devices is 
becoming increasingly prohibitive. As the cost and unreliability of access to VPNs have 
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solutions/chn-ix-internet-exchange/; “Internet Exchange Point (IXP),” Peering DB, accessed July 31, 2019, 
https://www.peeringdb.com/search?q=china. 
158 Charles Barry, “Internet Vulnerabilities of Large Organizations: Examining Resiliency across the 
Autonomous Systems Layer,” Digital Report, December 8, 2016, https://digital.report/internet-
vulnerabilities-of-large-organizations-examining-resiliency-across-the-autonomous-systems-layer/. 
159 Barry, “Internet Vulnerabilities of Large Organizations: Examining Resiliency across the 
Autonomous Systems Layer.” 
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increased, research into alternate approaches focusing on disrupting the Great Firewall 
handshake process has been conducted.161 As part of their research, Wang et al. developed 
an evasion program or tool (INTANG), which is able to disrupt and resync the handshake 
to yield an evasion success rate of 90 percent when compared to standard circumvention 
methods such as VPN and TOR.162 
c. KOLs
KOLs are among the most important marketing tools in China today as they can 
generate a staggering amount of e-commerce revenue through the 1+ billion social media 
users within China.163 Wei Zhou Xu, Li Yu Chun, and Jun Kai Wang are identified as top 
three social media influencers in China due to high levels of trust bestowed upon them by 
Chinese social media users,164 and consequently, their extensive ability to influence and 
engage more than 2.56 billion Millennial Chinese social media users.165  
The vulnerability assessment indicates that the Great Firewall is able to be bypassed 
using evasion tools such as INTANG. The assessment also finds that Chinese social media 
users trust and are influenced by social media posts from KOLs Wei Zhou Xu, Yu Chun 
Li, and Wang Jun Kai, and that WeChat is vulnerable to cyber operations, presenting 
targets of opportunity to be analyzed through a heuristic thought experiment to develop 
COAs to test the hypothesis presented at the outset of this chapter.  
161 Wang et al, “Your State Is Not Mine.” 
162 Wang et al, “Your State Is Not Mine,” 116. 
163 Joe Escobedo, “Nearly $150K per Post? What You Need to Know about China’s Key Opinion 
Leaders,” Forbes, May 22, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/joeescobedo/2017/05/22/key-opinion-
leaders-in-china/#5cbce80a72ee. 
164 Bomoda, “2017 China Key Opinion Leader Index Understanding Celebrity Influence.” 
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C. THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
The Great Firewall has been identified as vulnerable to cyber operations. The 
purpose of this section is to evaluate the use of non-escalatory cyber operations to exploit 
these vulnerabilities to create dissent among the Chinese population. The evaluation is 
reflected in Table 5, which is subsequently explained in more detail.  
Each target identified in the vulnerability assessment is listed in column 1, and the 
cyber operation (phishing) in the second column. The objective of the cyber operation 
(population dissent) is listed in the third column, and a prediction of the level of influence 
on the population (low, medium, high) is shown in the fourth column. The prediction of 
the level of influence on the population is determined as Medium due to KOL social media 
following reaching approximately 40 percent of Chinese internet citizens and 70 percent  
of Chinese Millennials, high levels of trust placed in each KOL, and high likelihood of 
KOL social media reaching the target audience. The effect of these cyber-attacks on regime 
stability is assessed in the final column under CCP Concession, with an allocation of 1 
indicating a concession and 0 resulting in no concession. Concession for this study is 
defined as CCP acknowledgment that the cyber operation may promote popular dissent, 
which is viewed as providing the United States with coercive power and strategic 
advantage. The column to the right of the score indicates the likelihood of escalation (low, 
medium, high) by the CCP in response to the cyber-attack. Concession scores are based on 
historical events as coded and recorded in the DCID 1.5.166  
D. ANALYSIS 
From Table 5, it can be ascertained that a cyber phishing campaign targeting social 
media followers of high-profile KOLs and an associated Information Operations (IO) 
campaign promoting social mobilization have a medium likelihood of creating popular 
dissent. A key audience for this campaign would be Chinese Millennials, seen participating 
in the current Hong Kong protests, who were the driving force behind the mass rallies 
voicing their distrust of mainland China and the CCP.167 As social media applications have 
166 Maness, Valeriano, and Jensen, “The Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset, Version 1.5.” 
167 Su-Lin Wong and Nicolle Liu, “Why Hong Kong’s Protesting Youth Are so Angry,” Financial 
Times, July 23, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/772e0d06-a921-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04. 
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been deemed vulnerable to cyber operations, this COA would utilize the KOL social media 
accounts shown in Table 5 to conduct a phishing campaign. This campaign would consist 
of a link embedded in a social media post containing code to an evasion program such as 
INTANG, which is automatically uploaded to the user’s computer or device, and enables 
the user to bypass the Great Firewall. As the evasion program does not require large 
amounts of bandwidth and is free, users are able to easily access the link recommended by 
the trusted KOL and visit “banned” websites. Websites such as the New York Times or 
Radio Free Asia that promote Western ideologies by focusing on social and political 
mobilization, environmental issues, and CCP human rights violations. These IO campaigns 
will generate high levels of exposure to Western ideologies and highlight the shortcomings 
of the CCP to encourage dissent among the population. 
The CCP views popular dissent as a contributing factor to regime instability. Cyber 
phishing operations detailed in Table 5 have the potential to create dissent among a large 
proportion of the Chinese population, which could lead to regime instability. Nonetheless, 
the creation of dissent among the population has a temporal aspect; unlike disruption or 
degradation strategies that have a direct measurable impact, influence operations require 
time. The amount of time required depends on the effectiveness of the IO campaign and its 
continued ability to bypass the Great Firewall. Taking this into consideration, the basis for 
the IO campaign is crucial in assessing CCP concession, as the CCP views social 
mobilization more of a stimulus to popular dissent than environmental issues and human 
rights violations. Therefore, it is assessed that issuance of a threat to conduct this COA and 
the social mobilization focused IO campaign has the potential to promote enough dissent 
among the Chinese population to concern the CCP and yield CCP concession. The coercive 
power of this attack can be further increased through diplomatic efforts focused on 
promoting social movement and highlighting the CCP’s inability to address growing 
environmental issues affecting the quality of life of Chinese citizens and the prosperity of 
the Chinese economy. Of note, CCP concession is not predicted for COAs that have a 
primary IO campaign focused on the environment and human rights violations,  because 
the CCP does not view these issues as threatening to regime stability as social mobilization.
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IO Campaign Population 
Influence 
CCP Concession 






Xu, Wei Zhou Phishing Population Dissent 
Social Mob 
Medium 1 Low 1 Low 1 Low 0 Low 
Li, Yu Chun Phishing Population Dissent 
Social Mob 
Medium 1 Low 1 Low 1 Low 0 Low 
Wang, Jun Kai Phishing Population Dissent 
Social Mob 
Medium 1 Low 1 Low 1 Low 0 Low 
Xu, Wei Zhou Phishing Population Dissent 
Environment 
Medium 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 
Li, Yu Chun Phishing Population Dissent 
Environment 
Medium 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 
Wang, Jun Kai Phishing Population Dissent 
Environment 
Medium 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 
Xu, Wei Zhou Phishing Population Dissent 
Human Rights 
Medium 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 
Li, Yu Chun Phishing Population Dissent 
Human Rights 
Medium 0 Low 0 Low  0 Low 0 Low 
Wang, Jun Kai Phishing Population Dissent 
Human Rights 
Medium 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 0 Low 
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Based on the analysis provided in this chapter, the hypothesisH2 Cyber 
operations combined with traditional forms of statecraft aimed at infiltrating the Great 
Firewall will promote dissent within the Chinese populationis upheld. 
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V. U.S. PREPAREDNESS AND CHINA’S RESPONSE 
This thesis has identified the social credit system and the Great Firewall as 
vulnerabilities within Chinese cyberspace and proposes that the United States can coerce 
the CCP through exploitation of these vulnerabilities to create or threaten popular dissent 
within China. This thesis has also argued that the exploitation of these vulnerabilities 
presents a mechanism to maintain or enhance the United States’ strategic advantage. Thus, 
U.S. preparedness and China’s responsive actions associated with pursing the COAs 
outlined in Chapters III and IV are now be explored to ensure the United States maintains 
or enhances its strategic advantage.  
The planning and execution of cyber operations is no different from that of 
traditional military operations and should be approached in the same manner. As such, the 
planning and execution considerations for these elements from a U.S. perspective are 
analyzed according to the following functional areas: timing and the strategic environment, 
approach, and ethics.  
A. TIMING AND THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
The end state for the COA proposed in Chapters III and IV is U.S. strategic 
advantage achieved through the creation of dissent among the population in China.  
Temporally, cyber denial operations targeting the Chinese social credit system 
represent the optimal COA to create popular dissent quickly as it impacts Chinese citizens’ 
ability to carry out their daily routine. To increase the likelihood of dissent quickly, the 
social credit system could be targeted multiple times over several weeks to heighten 
frustration and dissent among the population, thus increasing the coercive pressure on the 
CCP to concede or accept any conditions required by the United States. By contrast, cyber 
operations targeting the Great Firewall will take longer to create dissent among the 
population as it targets the cognitive domain using propaganda and Western ideologies. 
Therefore, as a recommendation, the United States may consider targeting both the social 
credit system and the Great Firewall in tandem to heighten the spread of popular dissent 
and force CCP concessions in a shorter time frame. In concert with the time taken to realize 
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popular dissent is the determination of the point at which popular dissent is achieved. The 
possible measures of success could be CCP concessions, removal of the censorship 
apparatus such as the Great Firewall, or social mobilization. Finally, the strategic 
environment needs to be incorporated into U.S. operational planning to ensure the most 
favorable conditions to achieve popular dissent. Periods of high popular dissent represent 
the most optimal time to conduct these operations, increasing the coercive power of United 
States. This is due to the fact that the CCP’s ultimate goal is the preservation of regime 
stability. 
B. APPROACH 
The decision to exploit Chinese cyberspace through a contemporary use of force 
requires a credible threat to be issued first. As China has such a mature cyber capability, 
the United States will need to weigh up the likelihood of China developing measures to 
counter the effectiveness of the cyber operations, rendering its threat and execution futile. 
As such, the wording of the threat needs to be carefully crafted so as not to reveal the target 
or process of the exploitation and maintain the element of surprise. In addition, China’s 
response to U.S. execution of the cyber-attack must also be taken into account.  
China’s predicted responses to the cyber operations detailed in Chapters III and IV 
are based on the anticipated reaction in the current “tit for tat” environment. It is assumed 
that China will rely on the use of the Great Cannon (as seen in the 2015 GitHub Hack) and 
continued cyber espionage of the U.S. IP network.168 The United States will also need to 
bear in mind that the predicted CCP responses are based on historical events and do not 
account for the direct targeting of the population, and that these COAs may be interpreted 
as escalatory.  
An analysis of China’s potential escalatory response to U.S. cyber operations 
targeting the social credit system and the Great Firewall and related U.S. considerations 
can be presented through political, economic, military, and social and informational 
viewpoints.  
 
168 Maness, Valeriano, and Jensen, “The Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset, Version 1.5.” 
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Politically, China may increase its diplomatic efforts to promote that state as a 
security partner of choice within the region. This serves to enhance China’s military and 
commercial links in the Indian Ocean and bolsters China’s coercive power over countries 
such as India.169 To address this effort, the United States may consider investing in 
bilateral relations with India, similar to the Mongolia and India cybersecurity program,170 
to bookend China and foster India’s role in curtailing China.171 Further, the United States 
may opt to strengthen quadrilateral alliances, such as the Indo Pacific Partnership with 
Australia, India, and Japan, and bilateral partnerships with Indonesia, Vietnam, and 
Singapore to preserve strategic advantage and deter China.172 The United States could also 
potentially assist regional partners within the Indo Pacific to enhance their respective 
cybersecurity capabilities to counter Chinese influence. 
Economically, in response to U.S. cyber operations targeting the social credit 
system and the Great Firewall, China could recall loans for BRI and Maritime Silk Road 
(MSR) initiatives from littoral states. As these states are unable to repay these loans they 
could be forced to concede territory to China as loan repayment.173 Acquisition of such 
territory provides strategic advantage to China, as it increases its ability to project military 
power globally beyond the first and second island chains, and geopolitical influence 
through commercial infrastructure and shipping companies.174 Thus, a key consideration 
for the United States would be to promote resiliency of susceptible littoral nations through 
engagement and investment from not only the United States but other middle powers within 
 
169 Mohan Malik, “China and India: Maritime Maneuvers and Geopolitical Shifts in the Indo-Pacific,” 
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173 Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan, “Competition without Catastrophe: How America Can Both 
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the region, such as Australia, India, and Japan. Additionally, the United States may 
leverage the growing concern of these littoral nations to repay Chinese debt to delegitimize 
and threaten future Chinese BRI efforts within the region. Further consideration could be 
afforded to the United States re-joining the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) to bolster and 
strengthen the institution to counter China economic aggression. 
From a military perspective, China’s response to these cyber operations may play 
out in the South China Sea. Such responses may include increased aggression toward the 
United States and allied nations conducting FONOPS, increased island building and 
militarization of reefs and rocks of the South China Sea, or enhanced Anti Access and Anti 
Denial (A2AD) capabilities. If China increased military aggression and island building 
within the South China Sea, such action could destabilize the area and increase tensions 
that result in inadvertent escalation and military confrontations within this area of 
operation.175 Thus, the United States might consider maintaining a strong military 
presence within the area and promote alliances with like-minded nations to deter such 
escalation. As a representation, the U.S. deterrence posture could be heightened through 
conduct of multi-nation military exercises within the South China Sea and the 
establishment of a permanent coalition maritime force within the area like that operating 
within the Persian Gulf. 
Socially, China may respond to such U.S. cyber operations by increasing internal 
pressure on minority groups and cracking down on dissidents. In its national defense 
policy, China has expressed that it will crack down on separatist movements, as well as 
deter and resist aggression.176 These crackdowns may involve human rights violations 
against Muslim populations, such as increased internment at CCP vocational training 
centers, and increased state-sponsored propaganda. As seen during the 2019 Hong Kong 
protests, the CCP created popular support by stirring up nationalism through propaganda 
 
175 Campbell and Sullivan, “Competition without Catastrophe: How America Can Both Challenge and 
Coexist with China,” 5–7. 
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campaigns via state-controlled media, calling for Chinese citizens to act out against 
enemies of China.177 The ability of the CCP to rally favor and promote trust within the 
population is a crucial consideration for the United States, as the success of the COAs 
proposed in this thesis is relies on ensuring popular dissent remains focused on the CCP.  
From an informational perspective to counter U.S. cyber operations targeting 
Chinese cyberspace, China may expand its Great Cannon targets. The Great Cannon has 
the ability to target and shut down any number of commercial, government, or defense 
websites to cause credible disruption to financial, military, and governmental departments. 
These attacks could target not only the United States but also U.S. allies. Thus, U.S. 
consideration may be afforded to ensuring the cybersecurity practices and infrastructures 
secure the U.S. IP network and assist in bolstering the IP network security of coalition 
partners. The creation of a hardened, secure, and resilient cyberspace of coalition partners 
has the potential to limit the effect of the Great Cannon, and prevent Chinese access to the 
IP network, which will reduce China’s warfighting advantage.  
Finally, consideration must be dedicated to an understanding of U.S. actions and 
global repercussions in the event of catastrophic success. Catastrophic success in this 
scenario would be CPP regime collapse. Since the CCP will not collapse or concede 
without a fight, the CCP response, based on historical events such as Tiananmen, would be 
rapid, unrelenting, and ruthless.178 Moreover, the collapse of the CCP would result in a 
domino effect: economies of countries such as Australia would be ruined; North Korea 
might seek to capitalize on this opportunity, plunging Japan and South Korea into high 
alert, which would increase anxiety and uncertainty in bordering countries.179 In China, 
global investment and infrastructure would halt, with the potential to send millions of 
Chinese citizens into poverty. With the potential for such far-reaching and devastating 
repercussions to occur, the United States will need measures in place to avoid catastrophe 
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in the event of regime collapse in China. Such measures, for instance, could allow the CCP 
to maintain power, under sanctions and regulations, to ensure a prosperous China that 
abides by the rules and norms of the liberal world order.  
C. ETHICS 
The offensive cyber operations presented in this study deny the Chinese populace 
access to applications within cyberspace and manipulate information within cyberspace to 
generate popular dissent within the physical domain. These operations, as per the DoD 
definition, operate below the threshold of armed conflict, and therefore do not constitute a 
use of force.180  However, whilst these operations would adhere to the principles of war, 
they do utilize a softer form of coercion, which constitutes a moral component and requires 
justification on ethical grounds.181 As such, the implementation of a framework is 
necessary to evaluate the cyber operation based on a set of criteria such as the one created 
by Michael Schmitt.182 Specifically, Schmitt recommends assessing actions against seven 
criteria (Severity, Immediacy, Directness, Invasiveness, Measurability, Presumptive 
Legitimacy, and Responsibility) to evaluate the consequences of the action. Such an 
assessment indicates whether an action from a moral perspective constitutes a use of force, 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States has adopted a strategy to address China’s threat to the national 
security and global supremacy of the United States. Regime stability and cyberspace are 
integral factors in the rise of China, and cyber operations provide the United States a non-
escalatory approach to pursing strategic objectives in the face of China’s growing power. 
The analysis in this thesis has validated the concept of the United States exploiting cyber 
vulnerabilities in China’s social credit system and the Great Firewall to undermine the 
foundations of the Chinese Communist state, enabling the United States to maintain or 
enhance its global supremacy. 
The preservation of regime stability through an ideologically pure and politically 
obedient society is a key tenet of China’s rise. One of the main platforms the CCP uses to 
preserve ideological purity and control of the population’s behavior is the social credit 
system. This thesis’ analysis of the social credit system ascertained the core applications 
(Alipay, WeChat, and WeChat Pay) used by the main providers of the social credit system 
(Tencent and Sesame Credit) are vulnerable to cyber disruption operations. With further 
analysis identifying the necessity of high levels of trust among the Chinese population for 
the social credit system, this study observes that the mere issuance of a threat to conduct 
cyber disruption operations targeting the social credit system has the potential to create 
significant levels popular dissent and induce CCP concession. Furthermore, to provoke 
CCP concessions, the coercive power of the attack can be bolstered by diplomatic 
statecraft.  
Regime stability in China rests primarily on the continuation of domestic stability. 
The CCP views the internet as a threat to domestic stability as the technology can be used 
to promote political change and overthrow the CCP. As such, the CCP employs the Great 
Firewall to control access to the internet through IP blocking and content filtering, and to 
promote trusted social media applications WeChat and Weibo to preserve domestic 
stability. This thesis’ analysis of the Great Firewall establishes that the evasion tool 
INTANG can bypass the Great Firewall, that Chinese internet users place high levels of 
trust in KOLs, and that WeChat is vulnerable to cyber phishing and defacement operations. 
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As such, this study reveals that the threat of a cyber phishing and defacement campaign 
utilizing the WeChat accounts of high-profile KOLs to deliver a Great Firewall evasion 
program such as INTANG has the potential to promote enough dissent among the Chinese 
population to concern the CCP and yield a CCP concession. Furthermore, the coercive 
power of this attack can be further increased through diplomatic efforts that focus on 
promoting social movement and highlight the CCP’s inability to address growing 
environmental and quality of life issues within China.  
The pursuit of these proposed cyber operations targeting the social credit system 
and the Great Firewall must maintain or enhance U.S. strategic advantage through the 
creation of Chinese popular dissent. Importantly, China’s predicted responses to the cyber 
operations detailed in this thesis are based on the anticipated reaction in the current “tit for 
tat” environment, and do not account for direct targeting of the population. As such during 
operational planning, it is essential to focus on U.S. preparedness and China’s responsive 
actions through functional areas; namely, timing and the strategic environment, as well as 
approach and ethics must be considered if China interprets these cyber threats as escalatory. 
To assuage this interpretation, this study proposes the United States preserve its strategic 
advantage by strengthening alliances and partnerships within the Indo Pacific; counter 
China’s economic aggression by bolstering the TPP; and create a resilient cyberspace of 
coalition partners to limit the effect of the Great Cannon and Chinese cyber espionage.  
The exploitation of China’s cyber domain is the key to the United States 
maintaining and enhancing its global supremacy. It is time for the U.S. Government to 
unlock the tools available in its own cyber arsenal and implement them. 
A. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings of this thesis, the following research recommendations are 
proposed to progress this line of enquiry into the future: 
1. Technical analysis and development of Great Firewall evasion tools/
applications is needed to promote global access to a free and open internet 
impervious to suppression. 
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2. Creation of a framework to define the threshold of non-escalatory and 
escalatory cyber operations targeting the population within authoritarian 
regimes is needed to establish a state’s “red-line” and inform operational 
planning. 
3. Development of performance measures to monitor internal sentiment 
among the population of China is needed to inform operational 
progression. 
4. Evaluation is needed of the strategic weight that the United States re-
joining the TPP will have on countering China’s economic aggression 
within the Indo Pacific. 
5. Assessment is needed of the leverage and strategic weight a multilateral 
approach of allied and like-minded nations’ cyber capabilities will have in 
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